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I. INTRODUCTION
“We do not prosecute by public pressure or by petition. We
prosecute based on the facts on any given case as well as the laws of
1
the state of Florida.” This might have seemed like an unremarkable
claim were it not made by Florida State Attorney Angela Corey about
2
George Zimmerman’s shooting of Trayvon Martin.
While on
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Phoenix Cai, Kim Chanbonpin, Jack Chin, Russ Covey, Donald Dripps, William
Edmondson, Yaniv Heled, Tim Kuhner, Paul Lombardo, Caren Morrison, Mike
Simons, Wadie Said, Shirin Sinnar, Lauren Sudeall-Lucas, Jonathan Todres, Anne
Tucker, Jenia Iontcheva Turner, and Ron Wright for thoughtful comments on
earlier drafts.
1
George Zimmerman Murder Charge Sets Up Hurdles for Prosecutors in Trayvon Martin
Shooting, CBSNEWS.COM (Apr. 12, 2012, 10:36 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301201_162-57412881/george-zimmerman-murder-charge-sets-up-hurdles-forprosecutors-in-trayvon-martin-shooting/.
2
See id.
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“neighborhood watch” Zimmerman shot Martin, an African3
American teenager. The prosecutor for Seminole County, where the
shooting occurred, resisted prosecuting Zimmerman given the
likelihood he would assert self-defense or, to use Florida’s statutory
4
language, that he “st[ood] his . . . ground.” Subsequently, Florida’s
governor appointed Angela Corey to the case; she decided to
5
prosecute Zimmerman for second-degree murder. Zimmerman’s
recent acquittal might appear to vindicate Seminole County’s initial
decision not to prosecute. That, however, is only true if one views
prosecutorial success exclusively in terms of obtaining convictions.
That view is incorrect because prosecutors have the unique capacity
to generate political meaning separate and apart from obtaining
convictions.
The uproar over Martin’s death echoed conflict that erupted
over “Stand Your Ground” when Florida first adopted that language
6
in 2005. In light of that history, Angela Corey’s ultimate decision to
prosecute George Zimmerman could not have been anything but
“political.” Florida’s Stand Your Ground law leaves much to
prosecutorial discretion and charging decisions are not typically
7
reviewable by a court. That prosecutors only elected to charge
Zimmerman after national uproar erupted over Martin’s death calls
her quote into serious question.
Corey casts politics and
prosecutorial discretion as binary opposites. She implies that politics
is a purely exogenous force that threatens the integrity of
prosecutorial decision-making.
She suggests that prosecutorial
discretion is simply the professional judgment intrinsic to the
interpretive exercise of applying law to fact. Discretion, in other
8
words, is principled while politics is not. Corey’s stark, binary
opposition between politics and discretion has parallels in legal
scholarship.
3

See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez & Michael Cooper, Prosecutor Files Charge of 2nd-Degree
Murder in Shooting of Martin, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2012, at A1.
4
Id.; FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013).
5
See Alvarez & Cooper, supra note 3.
6
See discussion infra Part III.B.i.
7
See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996).
8
Many would contend that, insofar as the Martin killing was concerned,
“politics” was more principled than prosecutorial discretion. See Kim Severson, Black
Man’s Killing in Georgia Eludes Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2012, at A1 (implying that
prosecutor unfairly declined self-defense case in the absence of public pressure akin
to that precipitated by Trayvon Martin’s death); Mallory Simon & Ann O’Neill,
Unstable ground: The Fine Line Between Self-Defense and Murder, CNN.COM, (Apr. 30,
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/29/us/stand-your-ground.
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This Article shows that the politics-discretion binary is pervasive
in criminal-justice scholarship and typically takes one of two forms.
In the first version (“Binary 1”), politics is a problem while in the
second version (“Binary 2”), discretion is. In Binary 1, politics is to
blame for criminal justice’s harsh excesses over the last three
9
decades. Politics is a toxic force impelled by the public’s taste for
10
vengeance. By this account, a fearful and easily manipulated public
readily embraces the “tough on crime” rhetoric that politicians feed
it. This dynamic, in turn, impels the creation of not just more
11
criminal laws, but broader and harsher ones.
Legislators are
perfectly willing to pass these laws knowing that prosecutors will have
the final say on what sort of cases are actually brought. In other
words, prosecutorial discretion is the check on politics’ punitive
excesses.
In Binary 2, discretion is the problem. Those who embrace this
version take an internal view of criminal justice and tend to be
12
preoccupied with agency costs.
Accounts in this camp have
13
analogized prosecutors’ offices to administrative agencies.
The
analogy is readily made in the federal context given that federal
14
But even in the state context, the
prosecutors are unelected.
analogy is plausible: prosecutors have broad discretion to interpret
and apply public law, the vast majority of which occurs outside public
9

See, e.g., JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE 49–59 (2003) (arguing that
American criminal justice policy is, ironically, harsher than Europe’s on account of
its democratic, non-status based history); William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV.
L. REV. 1969, 1982 (2008) [hereinafter Unequal Justice] (identifying political and legal
reasons for inequality in American criminal justice).
10
See Unequal Justice, supra note 9, at 1982 (arguing that in a system where
suburban voters have political strength criminal justice policy will “oscillate[] . . .
between wholesale indifference and unmitigated rage”).
11
See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 532–33 (2001) [hereinafter Pathological Politics].
12
See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial
Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 963–64 (2009); Erik Luna & Marianne Wade,
Prosecutors As Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413, 1507 (2010); Ronald Wright &
Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 86 (2002)
[hereinafter Tradeoff].
13
See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 874 (2009); Darryl K. Brown,
Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 323, 331–42 (2004); Gerald E.
Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2129,
2132–36 (1998); Marc. L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV.
125, 137 (2008) [hereinafter Black Box]; Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents,
Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 752–53 (2003).
14
See Barkow, supra note 13, at 876.
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15

view.
This raises the possibility of significant agency costs—for
example, prosecutors too readily decline cases or offer significant
16
discounts to defendants who are willing to plead guilty. Internal
solutions to these kinds of problems emphasize bureaucratic changes
that promote vigorous supervisory control over prosecutorial
discretion. The purpose is to align prosecutors’ incentives with
17
“stakeholders’” interests, of which the public is one. “Public” here
does not refer to the amorphous group of bloodlust-gripped citizens
that Binary 1 assumes, but rather a more localized group of citizens
that has definable interests regarding public safety and justice.
Accordingly, the politics that this public might generate is a check on
prosecutorial discretion.
Both versions of the politics-discretion binary are worthy of
critique. Both cast politics as exogenous to prosecutorial decisionmaking: politics is either an external constraint or an external
impetus. Both versions also embrace homogenized notions of the
“public.” In Binary 1, the “public” possesses shared and readily
identifiable biases and fears. In Binary 2, the “public” possesses a set
of shared and readily identifiable interests. Depending on which
binary one embraces, the regulatory question will either be how best
to insulate prosecutors from politics or how best to expose them to it.
Neither binary, however, offers guidance for how to think about
the prosecutorial role in the face of a heterogeneous public.
Heterogeneity is the defining feature of a pluralist democracy like
our own; different people have profoundly different views regarding
political and social issues. The “public,” whether writ large or small,
will not be unified in its beliefs, interests, or biases. The central
normative dilemma in a liberal democracy is how to make public
choices that are legitimate and just in the face of such
18
heterogeneity. Criminal justice illustrates the dilemma lucidly. It
often implicates issues of unique political and emotional salience—
for example, questions regarding what “victimhood” and “harm”
mean, what the scope of an individual’s right to use deadly force
should be, and when mistakes of judgment should be punished.
These, of course, were precisely the sorts of questions implicated by
15

See Black Box, supra note 13, at 137 (noting that plea bargaining’s prevalence
suggests decline of adversarial process in favor of administrative process).
16
See Tradeoff, supra note 12 at 86.
17
See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 12, at 963–64; Black Box, supra note 13, at 187–91.
18
See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, at xxv (2005) (“How is it possible
that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens
profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?”).
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the Martin shooting and subsequent Zimmerman prosecution.
Prosecutors have unique power to generate social and political
meaning through their discretionary choices—for example, to
prosecute or decline cases.
While that power derives from
prosecutors’ authority to punish, it is not reducible to it. Prosecutors’
capacity to generate political and social meaning is particularly
significant when they enforce a law around which there is (or has
been) “expressive conflict”—that is, public disagreement about the
19
content or value of the message that specific legislation sends. Such
conflict often takes the form of a debate as to what the effects of a
particular law are or will be. For example, proponents of Florida’s
Stand Your Ground law argued that the law reaffirmed a citizen’s
right to defend herself and would deter would-be assailants from
20
victimizing her. Opponents argued that the law communicated a
“shoot first, ask questions later” ethos that would encourage vigilante
21
justice.
The passage of a law around which there has been expressive
conflict does not extinguish the basis for conflict. Rather, passing a
law just shifts the conflict’s locus to prosecutors’ offices. Criminal
laws often rely on vague and general language subject to competing
interpretations. Such ambiguity will require prosecutors to make
choices that implicate the very questions that animated expressive
debate about the law itself. For example, hate-crime laws typically
enhance punishments for criminal misconduct that occurred
“because of” discrimination. Whether such language should just
encompass majority-on-minority violence or should extend to
minority-on-majority
(or
minority-on-minority)
violence
is
expressively fraught. This dilemma echoes the debate that swirled
around the passage of hate-crime laws in the 1990s: do they promote
22
or compromise equality?
Asking how prosecutors should use their unique expressive
power presents an opportunity to rethink our ideals regarding the
prosecutorial function in a pluralistic society. Most scholarship
concerning prosecutorial discretion is preoccupied with the question
of how best to channel or restrain prosecutorial discretion. This
Article takes a different tack on the accountability question. It asks,
what role should prosecutors play in holding the public and
19
20
21
22

See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 108–111 and accompanying text.
See id.
See infra Part III.B.ii.
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legislatures accountable? The answer takes us beyond the binary
formulations that prevail in the scholarly literature.
Drawing on political theory, this Article argues that prosecutors
should use their unique expressive power pedagogically—that is, to
advance constructive political dialogue in legislatures and amongst
citizens. Doing so would serve two interests. First, it would
encourage legislatures to revisit criminal laws in light of the effects
those laws are having in society. Second, it would promote more
intensive public engagement with criminal-justice policy. Both
interests are particularly important where a criminal law has been the
subject of expressive conflict, as was true for Stand Your Ground and
hate-crime laws. A liberal democracy’s dynamism turns on both
citizens’ and policy makers’ willingness to not only engage with
pressing social questions, but to revisit and reconsider earlier
positions they may have held regarding those questions. Prosecutors
are uniquely situated to facilitate this process. Viewed through a
pedagogical framework, prosecutors’ obligations would be less rigidly
dependent upon obtaining convictions—a trial loss, as in Zimmerman,
should not necessarily signify failure.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II reveals the extent to
which the discretion-politics binary saturates recent scholarly
literature on prosecutorial decision-making. While descriptively
instructive, this scholarship does not properly conceptualize the
significance of prosecutorial discretion in the face of democratic
pluralism. Part III demonstrates how and why prosecutorial choices
have expressive power. It uses Stand Your Ground and hate-crime
laws as examples. Part IV draws on liberal precepts to argue that the
ideal prosecutor should be a “pedagogical” one. Where ethically
possible, prosecutors should use their expressive power to promote
both legislative accountability and public dialogue. Both of these
interests are particularly important where there has been expressive
conflict around the relevant criminal law. However, prosecutors’
obligation to promote accountability and dialogue should not end
there. It should also extend to those criminal laws that are presently
uncontroversial, only because the legislature and public are not
paying attention.
II. POLITICS AND DISCRETION
Recent scholarship regarding prosecutorial discretion tends to
draw a binary opposition between politics and discretion. While law
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23

scholars have long recognized prosecutorial discretion’s breadth,
the last fifteen years have seen them turn to public choice theory and
24
organizational behavior to make sense of that reality. Those who
have highlighted legislatures’ profligate willingness to enact new
criminal laws tend to embrace what this Article refers to as “Binary
25
1.”
Binary 1 posits politics as the problem and prosecutorial
discretion as an imperfect bulwark against it. Passing criminal laws
allows legislators, with relatively little cost, to secure the expressive
26
purchase of being “tough on crime.” This appeals to members of
the voting public whose anxieties about crime are as deep as its
27
attention spans are shallow. By this account, sensationalist episodes
of violence galvanize a public that is otherwise indifferent to criminal
28
justice policy. If one accepts this view, it is pretty clear why savvy
politicians would have an easy time seducing the public with toughon-crime rhetoric. Politicians do not have to worry about the
consequences of the criminal laws they endorse because those laws
authorize enforcement without requiring it. This holds true even in
29
The difficult questions of how to
district attorney elections.
organize enforcement priorities are left to low-visibility prosecutorial
30
choices that lie well outside public purview or interest.
31
the
Given the “pathological” politics of criminal law,
opportunities for criminal prosecutions are virtually unlimited. In the
face of this reality, prosecutors tend towards leniency—they charge
far fewer crimes and demand far less punishment than the criminal
23

See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
193–94 (1970) [hereinafter DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE]; James Vorenberg, Decent
Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1522 (1981).
24
On the public choice front, see, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure,
Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn
About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1080 (1993); William J.
Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 803–05
(2006) [hereinafter Political Constitution]; On the organizational behavior front, see,
e.g., Bibas, supra note 12, at 996–1015; Richman, supra note 13, at 753.
25
See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE 169 (2007) [hereinafter ARBITRARY
JUSTICE] (arguing politics insufficient to hold prosecutors accountable); Bibas, supra
note 12 at 984 (“Voters . . . focus[ ] on memorable but unrepresentative stories.”).
26
See Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 532–33.
27
See Bibas, supra note 12, at 987–88 (noting that the public suffers from
“chronic misperceptions” about how criminal justice systems function); Dripps, supra
note 24, at 1089 (arguing public adopts victim’s perspective).
28
See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 12, at 983–87; Unequal Justice, supra note 9, at 1982.
29
See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 12, at 985–86; Erik Luna & Marianne Wade,
Prosecutors As Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413, 1508 (2010).
30
See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 13, at 874; Bibas, supra note 12, at 964.
31
See Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 532–33.
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32

law would permit.
However, because prosecutorial charging
discretion is not generally subject to judicial review, some scholars
33
Until recently,
worry about consistency and egalitarianism.
aggressive external—typically judicial—regulation was the answer
34
offered in response to these worries.
Recent criminal-justice scholarship is deeply skeptical of whether
external regulation of prosecutors, political or judicial, is effective or
35
even possible. These scholars tend to embrace what this Article calls
“Binary 2.” In this version of the binary, discretion is the problem
and the solution lies in properly aligning prosecutors’ incentives with
the public’s interests. Among these scholars, the trend has been to
look to administrative law and management theory for guidance.
Beginning with Gerald Lynch’s 1998 article, scholars have
increasingly analogized prosecutors’ offices to administrative
36
agencies. Lynch argued that federal criminal justice is more akin to
an inquisitorial than adversarial system. Federal prosecutors, not
37
judges, are the inquisitors who determine guilt and innocence.
Because the system is analogous to an administrative one, Lynch
argued in favor of applying administrative law’s accountability
38
principles to prosecutors. A number of writers have expanded on
39
Lynch’s core insight.
32

See id.
See, e.g., ARBITRARY JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 17; Vorenberg, supra note 23, at
1555–56.
34
See, e.g., DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 207; Vorenberg, supra note
23, at 1570–71.
35
See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 13, at 873–74; see also Bibas, supra note 12, at 963–
64 (describing external controls as only “moderately promising” vehicle for aligning
prosecutors’ interests with the public’s); Tradeoff, supra note 12, at 53 (questioning
efficacy of external controls). These scholars tend to view “external” regulation with
a somewhat jaundiced eye and propose “internal” approaches in lieu or in addition
to external ones. The mechanism by which prosecutors’ offices would adopt such
internal reforms, however, remains elusive—i.e., absent some form of political,
moral, or bureaucratic pressure from an external source, what will impel any given
prosecutors’ office to self-regulate more stringently? Technocratic solutions cannot
easily sidestep this fundamental question of political will. Cf. David Cole, Turning the
Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 39–40 (2011) (suggesting that
public’s willingness to identify with those in jail and prison could help end “mass
incarceration” in the United States).
36
Lynch, supra note 13, at 2117.
37
Id. at 2129.
38
Id. at 2143 (arguing prosecutors should issue regulations and hold formal
hearings).
39
See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 13, at 874; Black Box, supra note 13, at 137;
Richman, supra note 13, at 752–53.
33
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In Lynch’s wake, scholars have proposed bureaucratic and
40
corporate techniques to minimize agency costs, maximize fidelity to
41
42
law, and promote consistent, egalitarian decision-making. These
scholars assume that traditional electoral and political checks will
43
only restrain prosecutors in high-profile cases. The vast majority of
cases, however, are not high-profile, and for these cases the criminal
44
justice system is totally opaque. In these cases, prosecutors will make
choices that serve their own institutional purposes.
While
maximizing their overall conviction rate is typically one of these
purposes, it does not mean that prosecutors will obtain convictions in
45
ways that conform to popular understandings of fairness.
The
prevalence of plea-bargaining in our criminal justice system generates
significant agency costs that pull in the direction of undue harshness
or leniency.
For example, prosecutors may overcharge some
defendants with the expectation of charge bargaining to induce
46
guilty pleas.
With other defendants, prosecutors may offer
47
significant sentence reductions in order to induce pleas.
Recent scholarship is highly skeptical of external reforms like
48
banning plea-bargaining. Instead, for example, Stephanos Bibas has
argued for using a corporate law model to align prosecutors’
institutional incentives with the public’s and other “stakeholders’”
49
interests. Ronald Wright and Marc Miller, in a series of articles,
have suggested that more intensive, internal case screening and data
monitoring will improve the consistency and fairness of prosecutorial

40

See Bibas, supra note 12, at 963–64; Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 549–
50; see also Tradeoff, supra note 12, at 86 (discussing the agency cost problem that
arises when charge reduction is permitted in plea bargaining).
41
See Black Box, supra note 13, at 129.
42
See id. at 132.
43
Cf. Bibas, supra note 12, at 984 (suggesting that public tends to pay inordinate
attention to certain high-profile cases).
44
See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 912–13 (2006) (describing the dominance of “insiders” within
criminal justice bureaucracies).
45
See id. at 935–36 (suggesting a D.A.’s high conviction rate says little about the
terms on which the conviction was obtained); Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at
549–50.
46
See Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 519–20.
47
See id. at 519–20.
48
See Tradeoff, supra note 12, at 31 & nn.6–7 (criticizing external approach and
enumerating its proponents).
49
See Bibas, supra note 12, at 996–1015 (advocating for changes to prosecutors’
office structure, personnel policies, and office culture).
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50

choices.
They hypothesize that intensive screening would help
ensure that only viable cases are prosecuted and encourage more
51
trials and open pleas. Other proposals have included splitting off
prosecutors’ offices’ adjudicative functions from their investigative
52
functions as is the case with administrative agencies.
Implicit in both binaries are assumptions about politics, the
public, and criminal law that are worthy of critique. First, “the
public” is cast as a relatively stable entity with identifiable interests
that exogenously impel or restrain prosecutorial decision-making.
Binary 1 homogenizes “the public” by assuming the existence of an
undifferentiated public taste for vengeance. Similarly, the notion of
agency costs, so central to Binary 2, assumes that it is possible to
identify a shared public interest in particular criminal justice
53
outcomes. If one understands the “public interest” at a high level of
generality—for example, community safety—and the relevant
community is quite small, “the public” might seem homogeneous.
The more granular the definition of interests and the broader the
geographic unit, however, the more fragmented “the public” will
appear. Even within a neighborhood, for example, there are often
54
very different views of what constitutes a crime problem. In light of
this, it should not be surprising that there is so much disagreement
about when self-defense should be available to someone who has
killed another. Such pluralism is a defining feature of democratic
coexistence. Scholarship on prosecutorial discretion does not
provide a useful normative framework for thinking about how
prosecutors should make decisions in the face of such pluralism.
Of course, one might think that the criminal law itself suggests
some optimal level of prosecution. In theory, the law reflects the
legislature’s settled view of a particular issue. Thereafter, prosecutors
55
must simply apply the law. This was Prosecutor Corey’s suggestion.
It is, however, a wildly implausible one given the number of criminal

50

See, e.g., Black Box, supra note 13, at 166–72; Tradeoff, supra note 12, at 31–36.
They are very clear that their goal is not to achieve justice in individual cases, but a
better-run prosecutors’ office. Id. at 49–55. By that, they mean fair and consistent
across cases. Id. at 49–50.
51
See Tradeoff, supra note 12, at 49–55.
52
See Barkow, supra note 13, at 874.
53
See Bibas, supra note 12, at 963–64; Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 549–
50; see also Tradeoff, supra note 12, at 86 (discussing the agency cost problem that
arises when charge reduction is permitted in plea bargaining).
54
See SUDHIR ALLADI VENTAKESH, OFF THE BOOKS 72–73 (2006).
55
See supra Part I.
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laws and the vague language that often comprise them.
For
example, a law permitting use of deadly force where reasonably
necessary to thwart an imminent aggression does not, in and of itself,
57
suggest the terms of optimal application. This will be all the more
true where laws are crafted using terms whose meanings are
themselves subject of expressive uncertainty as is true with hate-crime
laws. The next section develops these points in detail.
III. PROSECUTION AND PLURALISM
Prosecutorial choices have the capacity to generate expressive
meaning that amplifies, diminishes, or operates in complete
disjunction from the criminal laws under which a case might be
brought. In a pluralistic society like our own, this power is
particularly significant where there has been expressive conflict over
a criminal law. Prosecutors will have to exercise their near absolute
discretion to charge or decline cases in the absence of public
consensus as to when such a law should apply, if ever. Typically, such
a law’s black letter will not answer how prosecutors should exercise
their discretion either.
Section A describes prosecutors’ power to generate expressive
meaning and how that power relates to criminal laws. Following that
theoretical discussion, Section B uses Stand Your Ground and hatecrime laws as case studies. In both contexts, the underlying criminal
law was subject to expressive conflict prior to passage. Both sets of
laws leave vast discretion to prosecutors. The charging decisions that
prosecutors must make under these laws often implicate the very
issues that generated expressive conflict around the underlying
criminal laws when they were enacted.
Many assumed that Stand Your Ground accounts for
prosecutors’ sluggishness in charging George Zimmerman. That
assumption is not warranted. The conflict around Stand Your
Ground congealed around the legislature’s use of that particular
rhetorical flourish.
The law, however, leaves prosecutors
considerable room to make discretionary choices that implicate the
very questions that gave rise to conflict around the law when it was
58
enacted. For example, the charging decisions in the Zimmerman
case impelled fierce debate about the right to protect oneself, racism,

56
57
58

See Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 529–33.
See infra Part III.B.i.
See infra notes 121–131.
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59

and gun violence. While the trial did not produce the catharsis that
some might have hoped for, in a liberal democracy there is intrinsic
value in public airing.
A similar story can be told about hate-crime laws. The debate
over whether enacting hate-crime laws is a good idea has long past.
That, however, cannot be taken to mean that there is broad social
consensus as to what constitutes a hate crime or when punishment
for such is appropriate—for example, should minority-on-minority or
minority-on-majority attacks count as hate crimes?
Section C
concludes by arguing that although head prosecutors are typically
elected, prosecutors’ expressive obligations should not exclusively be
to the local, electoral unit.
A. Expressive Enforcement
The mere existence of a criminal law does not foretell how, or if,
it will be enforced. This means that prosecutorial decision-making
potentially has the expressive potential to amplify, diminish, or act in
complete disjunction from the criminal law’s underlying message.
Expressive accounts of criminal law identify public denunciation
60
as its defining feature. “Public denunciation” means condemnation
leveled by the State. Such condemnation distinguishes “hard
treatment” from a “criminal sanction.” In a complex society
thoroughly penetrated by state apparatuses, hard treatment will come
in myriad forms. That it severely impinges upon an individual’s
economic or liberty interests, however, does not make hard treatment
61
a “criminal sanction” —there are circumstances in which the State
levies hefty fines or compels one individual to pay another to satisfy a
62
court-ordered judgment. The State might even preventively detain
63
an individual to forestall future harm, but it does so without
expressly condemning the detainee. Unaccompanied by official

59

See infra notes 108–114, and accompanying text.
See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, DOING & DESERVING 98–101 (1970); Dan M. Kahan, The
Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 419–21 (1999). Professor Kahan is
credited with reigniting interest in expressive theory in the criminal context. See
Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1363, 1369–70 (2000).
61
See FEINBERG, supra note 60, at 96; KAHAN, supra note 60, at 419–21.
62
See KAHAN, supra note 60, at 419.
63
See David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and
War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 695–96 (2009) (describing state and federal contexts in
which preventive detention is permitted).
60
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condemnation, hard treatment is simply hard treatment.
Condemnation is a searing symbolic performance—it proclaims
collective judgment that particular persons are less worthy than
others. Calling those who engage in misconduct “criminals” is to
degrade them. Expressive theories posit that the act of degrading
65
produces “social meaning” that, in turn, generates material effects.
It may, however, be difficult to precisely identify those effects. For
example, “social meaning” might mean creating new (or reaffirming
existing) social norms, enhancing a specific group’s dignity,
generating public feelings of security, or cultivating public
perception of the state’s competence to deal with pressing social
problems. Such effects need not be mutually exclusive. Congress’s
recent enactment of a federal hate-crime law relating to LGBT
66
victims presents a good example.
Although the law does not contemplate an aggressive
enforcement mechanism, advocates vigorously supported its
67
passage. The law sends the message that attacking LGBT persons is
no less a violation of equality precepts than discriminatory attacks
against other minorities. Advocates hope that this in turn will
consolidate norms of tolerance for LGBT persons, if not deeper
68
bonds of civic friendship between them and others.
Advocates,
however, would be hard-pressed to identify the precise sociological
mechanism(s) by which a hate-crime law will generate such effects.
Such a law acts in conjunction with an array of social forces the net
effect of which is, hopefully, greater social acceptance of LGBT
persons. It is, however, difficult to imagine how this would happen in
69
the absence of vigorous federal enforcement. This invites the more
general question of what expressive relationship, if any, exists
between a law and its enforcement.
64

See FEINBERG, supra note 60, at 98.
See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV.
453, 471–74 (1997) (discussing stigma’s capacity to shape behavioral norms);
Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 520–21.
66
See Matthew Shepard & James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009).
67
See Michael F. Pabian, The Hate Crimes Prevention Act: Political Symbol or
Prosecutorial Tool?, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 347, 347 (2012).
68
While a deontologist may be satisfied with a relation of tolerance, a
communitarian would likely not be. See Nirej S. Sekhon, Equality and Identity
Hierarchy, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY, 349, 365–66 (2008). The communitarian would
seek to promote deeper bonds between citizens. See id. at 377–78.
69
See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or
Tool for Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1267 (2000).
65
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Intuitively, we expect some relationship between the social
meaning produced by a criminal law and the specific cases brought
under that law. A criminal law both denounces a category of conduct
and confers discretionary authority upon prosecutors to condemn
specific individuals for engaging in such conduct. Criminal laws are
generally enacted with the expectation that they will be enforced and
have some impact in the world. Scholars have recognized the
70
intuition, but much of the work on enforcement and social meaning
to date has focused on how low-level criminal law enforcement—in
poor communities, in particular—generate norms of law71
abidingness. In contrast, this article asks what relationship exists
between the social meaning legislative enactments generate—for
example, the actual Stand Your Ground law—and the prosecutorial
choices made pursuant to such laws. The answer is particularly
important where a law like Stand Your Ground is enacted for the very
purpose of making a broad expressive statement.
There are three ways in which the two orders of social meaning
will interact: amplification, diminution, or disjunction. Empirically,
the relationships will be complex and, often, indeterminable. The
empirical difficulties that stymie sociological conclusions about law
and social meaning will be even more nettlesome when assessing the
72
relationships between law and prosecutorial practices. This is in
part because prosecutorial practices include non-action—that is,
declining cases—about which the world typically hears nothing. In
this regard, the case against George Zimmerman is exceptional.
One might expect a straightforward amplification or diminution
in the relation between law and prosecutorial practice where a
criminal law expressly affirms the value of victims’ lives. For example,
Congress criminalized human trafficking because it is “a
contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are
73
predominantly women and children . . . .”
Despite the bold
70

See FEINBERG, supra note 60, at 104 (“[U]nreliable enforcement gives rise to
doubts that the law really means what it says.”); Beale, supra note 69, at 1267;
Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 521.
71
See infra notes 174–175 and accompanying text.
72
Even in the rare cases where data regarding prosecutorial choices is made
available, interpreters are left to make educated guesses about the reasons for
particular choices. See Black Box, supra note 13, at 149–53 (speculating on the causes
of changes in the rates at which New Orleans prosecutors charge/decline domestic
violence cases).
73
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106386, § 102(a), 114 Stat. 1464, 1467 (2006) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7101
(2013)).
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language, there have been strikingly few prosecutions.
Positive
social meaning regarding the value of victims’ lives is likely generated
in proportion to the actual enforcement of the trafficking law for a
couple of reasons. First, prosecuting cases keeps the plight of victims
in the public eye. Second, and related, prosecution also highlights
the government’s seriousness about making good on its legislative
commitment to victims—that is, successful prosecutions will amplify
the legislative message that trafficking victims are actually not
“slaves.” Non-enforcement very likely sends the exact opposite
75
message.
This intuitive amplification relation, however, may not
always hold.
Overly aggressive enforcement may diminish the social meaning
that a contested criminal law was supposed to produce. Take for
example the recent criminal conviction and sentencing of Dharun
Ravi in New Jersey. A jury convicted Ravi for eavesdropping on his
gay college roommate Tyler Clementi’s sexual encounter with
76
another man. As widely reported, Clementi killed himself soon after
77
learning of what Ravi had done. A jury convicted Ravi under New
78
The conviction and sentencing
Jersey’s “bias intimidation law.”
generated national controversy with many suggesting that
79
prosecutors overreached. Even prominent LGBT advocates were
split on whether a harsh sentence for Ravi would help or hinder their
80
Echoing intuitions about amplification and
political agenda.
diminution described in the paragraph above, many advocates felt
that a harsh sentence would signify the value of LGBT lives and New
81
Jersey’s commitment to equality. Other advocates, however, feared
74

See Jonathan Todres, Moving Upstream: The Merits of a Public Health Law
Approach to Human Trafficking, 89 N.C. L. REV. 447, 457–58 & n.36 (2011)
(questioning the practical value of criminalization).
75
Cf. id.; see also Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 521.
76
See Kate Zernike, 30-Day Term for Spying on Roommate at Rutgers, N.Y. TIMES, May
22, 2012, at A1.
77
See id.
78
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:16-1 (West 2013). New Jersey’s statute makes it a crime
to engage in any of a series of enumerated crimes with intention to intimidate based
upon specified criteria, including sexual orientation. Id. The New Jersey statute is
fairly typical of statutes that criminalize bias-related acts. See infra notes 148–150 and
accompanying text.
79
See generally Ian Parker, The Story of a Suicide, NEW YORKER (Feb. 6, 2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/02/06/120206fa_fact_parker?currentP
age=all.
80
See Kate Zernike, In Rutgers Spying Case, Voices for Gay Rights Urge Leniency, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 2012, at A1.
81
See id.
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that a harsh sentence would offend broad-based public sentiments
about LGBT people receiving undeserved special recognition—that
is, a harsh sentence could send the message that LGBT victims’ lives
were being treated as more valuable than those of non-LGBT victims
82
on account of LGBT groups’ political clout.
This fear was not
necessarily driven by social conservatives’ reactions.
By some
mainstream liberal accounts, Ravi’s misconduct was more attributable
83
to juvenile stupidity than to homophobic malevolence. The actual,
84
relatively light sentence meted out reflects this notion.
The Ravi case suggests how prosecutorial choices may
differentially produce social meaning among majority and minority
groups. While prosecutorial choices may affirm the social meaning
produced by a law in one community, they may diminish it in
another. The prosecution of criminal cases in the Jim Crow South
85
presents a fairly extreme example. Criminal laws forbidding killing
and other grievous violence were rarely enforced in response to
violence within black communities, let alone between white
86
aggressors and black victims. The systematic non-enforcement of
87
criminal law helped sustain blacks’ inferior social status. Laws of
general application are supposed to apply in equal measure to all
human beings; the State’s refusal to act in response to black
victimhood consolidated the racist sentiment of blacks’ social status
as subhuman. In this regard, non-enforcement amplified the
88
defining ethos of the Jim Crow legal order.
The line between diminution and disjunction will often be fuzzy.
Critics of the Ravi prosecutions could have plausibly argued that it
diminished or was disjointed from New Jersey’s hate-crime law. A

82

See id.
Ian Parker’s account of the case in The New Yorker, for instance, is such an
account. See Parker, supra note 79.
84
See Kate Zernike, Judge Defends Penalty in Rutgers Spying Case, Saying It Fits Crime,
N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2012, at A22.
85
As used in contemporary equal protection vernacular, selective prosecution
means that a criminal law was enforced against a particular group for an
impermissible reason–e.g., racism. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465
(1996).
86
See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 76–135 (1997) (detailing
history of unequal enforcement).
87
See id. at 29 (“Deliberately withholding protection against criminality . . . is one
of the most destructive forms of oppression that has been visited upon AfricanAmericans.”).
88
See, e.g., id. at 41–48 (arguing southern states’ failure to enact or enforce antilynching laws ensured white supremacy).
83
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straightforward example of pure disjunction might be found in highprofile pretextual prosecutions. These are cases in which the
government aggressively prosecutes for a crime that is unrelated to
(and less serious than) the one prosecutors and the public believe
the defendant is guilty of. Al Capone’s conviction for tax evasion is
89
The highly publicized prosecution generated
illustrative.
considerable expressive meaning. That meaning could only have an
ironic relation (at best) to the tax law under which Capone was
prosecuted and the numerous more significant criminal laws under
which he was not.
B. Prosecutorial Discretion and Expressive Conflict
Expressive conflict is a defining feature of any large, pluralistic
democracy. There will, and should be, disagreement about how to
90
address fundamental political and social questions.
Both Stand
Your Ground and hate-crime laws demonstrate prosecutors’ unique
power to produce social and political meaning. That expressive
power does not depend upon obtaining convictions in particular
cases. It is particularly pitched where public opinion about a criminal
law is fractured. Consensus may be lacking because a law contains a
controversial norm, as is the case with Stand Your Ground. People
have very different views on whether the State should permit
individuals to “stand their ground” in situations where they feel
threatened. Alternatively, with hate crimes, consensus is lacking
because the law contains an “incompletely theorized agreement”—
meaning there is broad agreement about a very general norm, but no
91
agreement as to specifically when it should apply. Most people, for
example, agree that racial discrimination is bad, but disagree as to
what constitutes racial discrimination.
1. Standing One’s Ground
Trayvon Martin’s death and George Zimmerman’s subsequent
prosecution rekindled expressive conflict over Florida’s Stand Your
Ground law.
Many commentators blamed Florida’s ostensibly
permissive self-defense law for both the Seminole County
Prosecutor’s torpid response to Martin’s death and Zimmerman’s

89

See Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 551.
See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 18, at xxv.
91
See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733,
1739 (1995).
90
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92

subsequent acquittal.
Those criticisms are redolent of the more
general public criticism leveled against Stand Your Ground in 2005
93
when Florida enacted it. The suggestion, however, that Stand Your
Ground prevented Seminole County from bringing charges is belied
by the fact that the subsequently appointed prosecutor brought
94
charges against George Zimmerman. Zimmerman’s recent acquittal
might appear to vindicate the Seminole County prosecutor’s initial
refusal to prosecute. That is only true, however, if one imagines
prosecutors’ significance primarily in terms of obtaining convictions.
Part III below develops the argument against that conception.
Prosecutors have the capacity to do more than just obtain
convictions—they have power to stir social and political meaning
around contested social issues. Criminal laws generally, and Stand
Your Ground in particular, afford prosecutors considerable latitude
with regard to bringing (or declining) cases. Prosecutors’ expressive
power is potentially independent of any conviction they might secure.
George Zimmerman’s recent acquittal bolsters this point—the trial
has impelled a national dialogue about race, violence, and selfdefense. It may even be that the acquittal has made for more
animated political dialogue than a conviction would have.
Florida was the first state to adopt a so-called “stand your
95
ground” statute in 2005. While the expressive flourish “stand your
ground” has been a lightning rod for controversy, the law did not
effect as a dramatic a change to Florida’s self-defense law as the
controversy might suggest. The actual changes that the 2005 law
effected did not constrain prosecutorial charging discretion in a case
like the Martin shooting any more so than the predecessor law did.
The expression “stand your ground” appears in place of what had
96
previously been an express duty to retreat. A number of states have
97
eliminated the express duty to retreat, although only some have
92

See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Acquitted in Trayvon Martin
Killing, N.Y. TIMES at A1 (July 13, 2013); Alvarez & Cooper, supra note 3.
93
See infra notes 108–113 and accompanying text.
94
See Alvarez & Cooper, supra note 3.
95
See Ben Montgomery & Colleen Jenkins, Five Years Since Florida Enacted “StandYour-Ground” Law, Justifiable Homicides are Up, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 15, 2010),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime
/five-years-since-florida-enacted-stand-your-ground-law-justifiable/1128317.
96
Compare FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013), with Berrios v. State, 781 So. 2d 455,
457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (describing duty to retreat required under common
law and pre-2005 Florida statute).
97
See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(c)(2) (2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.050(4)
(LexisNexis 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-611(b)(1) (2013).
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98

elected to use the contentious phrase, “stand your ground.”
Eliminating an express duty to retreat need not restrain prosecutors’
charging leverage because self-defense still requires that the
defendant have reasonably perceived an imminent threat of serious
99
physical injury before using deadly force. One might argue that the
perception of an imminent threat cannot be reasonable if it was
100
readily possible to avoid it by retreating.
At the very least, the
reasonableness requirement means that Stand Your Ground is not
purely subjective. An individual who has an idiosyncratically pitched
sense of vulnerability will not be able to claim self-defense when she
“shoots first and asks questions later.” While this is generally true of
self-defense in most jurisdictions, Stand Your Ground does contain an
important exception: when someone is in her home or car and uses
deadly force against an invader, there is a presumption that she did
101
so while in fear of imminent injury or death. The defendant need
not demonstrate that she actually and subjectively feared imminent
102
harm. While this license to kill invaders is troublesome, it was never
at play in the Zimmerman case since his encounter with Martin
occurred outside.
Expressive conflict over the law congealed around the
expression “stand your ground” rather than any specific, substantive
103
provision.
The perception that Stand Your Ground was more
permissive of defensive violence impelled public uproar, both for and
104
against the law. Florida’s law was adapted from model legislation
98

See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(b) (2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-411
(2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-24 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5230 (2013); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:20(C) (2013).
99
FLA. STAT. § 776.012(1) (2013).
100
While Florida’s Stand Your Ground law does not require a duty to retreat, it
seems to permit the finder of fact to consider the possibility of retreat as relevant to
reasonableness. See Williams v. State, 982 So. 2d 1190, 1194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §14:20(D) (2013) (“No finder of fact shall be permitted to
consider the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether or not the
person who used deadly force had a reasonable belief . . . .”).
101
FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1)(a) (2013).
102
See infra text accompanying note 217.
103
See, e.g., Steve Bousquet, Bill Would Loosen Self-Defense, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Feb. 24, 2005, at 1B; John-Thor Dahlburg, Florida Law Lets Citizens ‘Meet Force With
Force,’ L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2005, at 10; Abby Goodnough, Florida Expands Right to Use
Deadly Force in Self-Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2005, at A18; Governor to Sign Deadly
Force
Bill,
GAINESVILLE
SUN
(Apr.
6,
2005),
http://www.gainesville.com/article/20050406/LOCAL/50405053
[hereinafter
Deadly Force].
104
See, e.g., Bousquet, supra note 103; Dahlburg, supra note 103; Goodnough,
supra note 103.
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crafted by the National Rifle Association (NRA).
The NRA’s
106
primary mission, of course, is to promote gun ownership and use.
Stand Your Ground was a potent battle cry for the organization and
the Florida law was the first victory in what was to be a fairly successful
107
national campaign. Stand Your Ground’s proponents extolled it as
an affirmation of vigilant individualism in the face of an incompetent
and paternalistic state, excoriating the government for its inability to
protect individuals from violence and its insistence on prosecuting
108
those who protected themselves.
The law’s opponents charged that Stand Your Ground would
encourage (and reward) lawless individualism. Gun-toting vigilantes
109
would avenge the slightest slight with gunfire, eroding rule of law,
110
and transforming Florida into a wild-west caricature. A gun control
group went so far as to put up signs on Florida highways that read
“Visitor Warning. Florida residents can use deadly force. Please be
111
careful.”
This debate echoes the historic conflict around self112
Trayvon Martin’s
defense, and the duty to retreat in particular.
105

See Andrew Metz, NRA Targets New York, Other States with ‘Stand-Your-Ground’
Bill, NEWSDAY, Apr. 28, 2005; Kris Hundley, Susan Taylor Martin & Connie Humburg,
‘Stand Your Ground’: A Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card, MIAMI HERALD (June 2, 2012),
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/06/02/2830091
/stand-your-ground-a-get-out-of.html; Susan Latham Carr, Bill Permits Use of Force
Against Intruders, OCALA STAR-BANNER (Feb. 24, 2005), http://www.ocala.com
/article/20050224/NEWS/202240398?p=1&tc=pg.
106
See About Us, NRA.COM, http://home.nra.org/history/document/about (last
visited Nov. 3, 2013).
107
Twenty-three states have enacted some version of Stand Your Ground,
although not all of them necessarily include that particular expression. See Cora
Currier, 23 Other States Have “Stand Your Ground” Too, ATLANTIC WIRE (Mar. 22, 2012),
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/national/2012/03/23-other-states-have-stand-yourground-laws-too/50226/ (listing states and linking to specific statutes).
108
See Bousquet, supra note 103 (“Law-abiding people should not be told that if
they are attacked, they should turn around and run . . . This bill gives back rights that
have been eroded and taken away by a judicial system that . . . appears to give
preferential treatment to criminals.” (quoting NRA lobbyist)); Deana Poole, Gun Bill
Could Mean: Shoot First, Ask Later, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 23 2005, at 1A (“You should
not have to retreat in order to save your life.” (quoting bill’s sponsor)).
109
See, e.g., David Royse, House Debates Bill Allowing Deadly Force, THELEDGER.COM
(Apr. 1, 2005), http://www.theledger.com/article/20050401/NEWS/504010369
(suggesting that law will permit deadly force in response to someone at a restaurant
who “pushes you and reaches into their pocket”).
110
See, e.g., Deadly Force, supra note 103 (quoting state legislator opposed to the
bill); Poole, supra note 108 108(“Florida could wind up back in the Wild West . . . .”).
111
John Pacenti, New Law On Deadly Force Caught In Gun Politics, PALM BEACH
POST, Sep. 27, 2005, at 1B. See also id. (describing effort to leverage Florida’s reliance
on tourist economy against Stand Your Ground law).
112
See Kahan, supra note 60, at 432–33.
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death and Zimmerman’s subsequent acquittal seemed to confirm
113
opponents’ fears.
Following Martin’s death, and in the acquittal’s wake, critics
charge that Stand Your Ground devalues minority life in at least two
ways.
First, by valorizing vigilantism and male aggression, it
encourages the likes of George Zimmerman to (a) carry firearms and
(b) impulsively shoot before reflecting on the nature of the threat an
114
ostensible assailant poses.
Social psychology researchers have
demonstrated that most Americans subconsciously associate black
115
youth with violence and criminality.
To the extent that such
feelings structure subconscious perceptions of others’ aggressiveness,
we should expect individuals to be quicker to find black youth more
116
threatening than white youth.
If one accepts that Stand Your
Ground encourages the use of force without reflection, one might
expect young minorities to inordinately be on the receiving end of
such violence.
Second, critics charge that Stand Your Ground amplified
prosecutorial lethargy in charging George Zimmerman and
117
completely stymied prosecution in other less notorious cases. Stand
Your Ground exacerbated prosecutors’ and police departments’
118
longstanding tendency to neglect minority crime victims.
Critics
have long highlighted how the systematic devaluation of minority life
manifests as official disinterest in violent crime where minorities are
119
the victims.
But, it is unclear why Stand Your Ground would
120
amplify that disinterest. As suggested above, Stand Your Ground
113

See Adam Nagourney, Prayer, Protests, and Anger Greet Florida Verdict, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 2013, at A1.
114
See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, A Florida Law Gets Scrutiny After a Killing, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 2012, at A1; Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed., The Curious Case of Trayvon Martin,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2012, at A21.
115
See, e.g., L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95
MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2044–52 (2011) (discussing research on implicit bias).
116
See Blow, supra note 114.
117
See, e.g., Anna Marie Smith, Deadly Force & Public Reason, THEORY & EVENT, Vol.
15.3, 2012, at 7–8; Hundley, Martin & Humburg, supra note 105; Fred Grimm,
Commentary: The Troubling History of Stand-Your-Ground Laws, MCCLATCHYDC (Mar. 24,
2012), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/03/26/143105
/commentary-the-troubling-history.html.
118
See KENNEDY, supra note 86, at 120; Hundley, Martin & Humburg, supra note
105 (“Defendants claiming ‘stand your ground’ are more likely to prevail if the victim
is black.”).
119
See KENNEDY, supra note 86, at 120.
120
Of course, this claim is not true in those cases involving home invasions and
carjackings. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1)(a) (2013).
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121

affords prosecutors considerable discretion.
Angela Corey
exploited that discretion following the national protests demanding
122
Stand Your Ground no more foreclosed this than
prosecution.
would have a statute not containing that phrase. Of course, there are
many who now say that the decision to prosecute was the wrong one
and itself racially impelled—that is, the protests over the initial
123
declination led to a race-conscious decision to prosecute.
Charging or declining to charge George Zimmerman would
have both generated social meaning with regard to race. The Florida
legislature’s enactment of Stand Your Ground sent a general message
124
that self-defense should be more broadly available.
Had state
prosecutors been particularly intent on amplifying that message, they
might have stuck with the initial decision not to prosecute
Zimmerman. Doing so, however, would have tended to confirm
protestors’ claims that Florida prosecutors do not value black victims.
While Zimmerman’s acquittal also amplified the legislature’s
message, it did so in a qualitatively different manner. The trial
produced a more sustained and farther-reaching conversation about
race and violence than would have likely occurred otherwise. While a
good bit of it was partisan and shrill, much of it was not. Part IV
develops the argument that, from an expressive perspective, the
acquittal was more constructive than declining to prosecute the case
125
would have been.
That either declension or trial in the Zimmerman case would have
been expressively rich is a function of the unique public attention
that case has received. Typically, declinations will fly under the
expressive radar. Prosecutors do not have any obligation to report
declinations to the public. Thus, it is difficult to say whether there

121

See, e.g., Severson, supra note 8; Simon & O’Neill, supra note 8.
See Serge F. Kovaleski, In Martin Case, Police Missteps Add to Challenges to Find
Truth, N.Y. TIMES, MAY 17, 2012, at A1 (describing protests following Samford Police
Department’s failure to arrest Zimmerman and Prosecutor Wolfinger’s suggestion
that the case against Zimmerman should be put to a grand jury); Timothy Williams,
Grand Jury Won’t Be Convened in Florida Teenager’s Killing, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/10/us/trayvon-martin-prosecutor-wont-convenegrand-jury.html?_r=0.
123
See, e.g., Jacob Sullum, Op-Ed, Why Zimmerman Should Be Acquitted, N.Y. POST
(July 11, 2013), http://nypost.com/2013/07/11/why-zimmerman-should-beacquitted/.
124
This, at least, seems like the most plausible reading of the legislature’s
symbolic gesture of including the “stand your ground” language in the revised selfdefense statute. See FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3).
125
See infra Part IV.B.i.
122
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have been more declinations following Stand Your Ground’s
126
It is even more difficult to say whether, broadly
enactment.
speaking, Stand Your Ground has impelled the kind of wild-west
violence that critics feared or whether it has led to disproportionate
127
minority victimization.
There has been suggestion that such force
128
has been on the rise. The reported uptick in self-defense claims in
Florida, however, is consistent with any number of causal accounts of
which increased civilian willingness to use deadly force is but one. It
could also be that prosecutors are less willing to decline such cases—
that is, more of them appear in the system. Alternatively, entirely
exogenous factors could create such an uptick—for example,
increases in home invasions that, in turn, precipitate defensive force.
At least one Florida newspaper has attempted to systematically
assemble information on how prosecutors have exercised discretion
129
in self-defense cases.
But, the effort has yielded partial results at
130
best.
Better empirical data will not forever resolve expressive
conflict over Stand Your Ground, self-defense, or minority
131
But it would meaningfully inform and animate
victimization.
public dialogue.
2. Colorblind Hate Crime
Prosecutors have considerable expressive power in the hatecrime context because hate-crime laws are an example of what Cass
132
Sunstein calls “incompletely theorized agreements.”
Members of
the public often agree about very general norms—for example, racial
discrimination is reprehensible. But, they disagree about how to
apply those norms—for example, is affirmative action racially

126

But see Alvarez, supra note 114 (quoting Florida prosecutors who suggested
that there have been a higher volume of self-defense claims in the wake of Stand
Your Ground’s passage).
127
Although there have been media reports of both. Media reports have
indicated that self-defense claims have increased since the law was passed and that
these defenses are frequently successful. See Hundley, Martin & Humburg, supra note
105.
128
Hundley, Martin & Humburg, supra note 105.
129
Kris Hundley, Susan Taylor Martin & Connie Humburg, Florida ‘Stand Your
Ground’ Law Yields Some Shocking Outcomes Depending on How Law Is Applied, TAMPA BAY
TIMES (Jun. 3, 2012), http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/floridastand-your-ground-law-yields-some-shocking-outcomes-depending-on/1233133.
130
See id.
131
See Susan Taylor Martin, Kris Hundley & Connie Humburg, Race’s Complex
Role, TAMPA BAY TIMES, June 4, 2012, at 1A.
132
Sunstein, supra note 91, at 1733, 1739.
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133

discriminatory? The affirmative action example also highlights the
difference between an “anti-subordination” perspective and an “anti134
The former is concerned with practices that
classification” one.
contribute to minority subjugation. In contrast, the latter is
concerned with practices that classify based on objectionable criteria
135
regardless of whether subjugation results.
The expressive conflict
over hate-crime legislation was largely realized between these two
poles. The passage of hate-crime laws, however, did not actually
resolve the fundamental debate between the two. Because of hatecrime laws’ open-ended wording, the debate’s resolution fell to
prosecutors.
Expressive conflict swirled about hate-crime legislation’s passage
136
fifteen years ago.
Proponents generally took an antisubordinationist tack, arguing that hate-crime laws would affirm the
civic standing of groups that had historically been subject to
discrimination. Hate-crime laws were supposed to disavow the most
137
violent manifestations of such discrimination.
Doing so would
recognize the unique stigmatic burdens such conduct imposes upon
138
individual victims and their communities.
The laws would also
139
Advocates have often
affirm society’s commitment to equality.
sought passage of hate-crime legislation as part of a broader agenda
140
to consolidate a group’s dignitary status.
For example, the recent
debate regarding “sexual identity” in the federal hate-crime statute
was part of a broader campaign to secure state recognition of gay
identity—a campaign that included the repeal of “don’t ask, don’t
133

Sunstein, supra note 91, at 1739.
See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1537 (2004)
(arguing that “anticlassification” rationale of Court’s recent Equal Protection Clause
cases has limited the more radical “antisubordination” rationale that girds Brown v.
Board of Education).
135
See id.
136
See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 60, at 463–67.
137
See Kahan, supra note 60, at 464. Hate-crime legislation is often precipitated
by high-profile instances of bias-motivated crime. For example, in 2009 Congress
enacted the “Matthew Shepard & James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act” which,
among other things, expanded existing federal hate-crime law to include “sexual
orientation.” Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, 2840 (2009). Both Shepard and
Byrd were victims in separate high-profile homicides that occurred in the late 1990s.
The Hate Crimes Prevention Act was initially proposed in 1999. See Beale, supra note
69, at 1228 n.1 (detailing the bill’s early legislative history).
138
See Kahan, supra note 60, at 464.
139
See id. at 464–66.
140
See id. at 465–66.
134
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141

tell” and legalizing gay marriage.
Critics of hate-crime legislation took an anti-classification tack.
They impugned hate-crime legislation for violating basic equality
principles by treating some crimes (and victims) more seriously than
142
others based on the victim’s identity. Critics also pointed out that
criminal law traditionally differentiated mens rea from motive,
143
relegating the latter to an evidentiary question.
These criticisms
did not succeed in quelling widespread passage of hate-crime laws
144
across the United States.
Voting in favor of a hate-crime law was
tantamount to proclaiming one’s commitment to civil rights and
145
Legislatures could do so without any
revulsion to bigotry.
redistributive commitment of the kind associated with programs like
affirmative action. Legislatures did not even have to explicitly
commit to an anti-subordination perspective. Rather, the laws they
passed were sufficiently vague such that they could be read
consistently with both anti-subordination and anti-classification
positions.
All hate-crime statutes punish attacks carried out because an
individual is (or is perceived by the assailant) to be part of a
protected group. By either creating a new crime or a sentencing
146
enhancement, hate crimes increase punishment for engaging in
independently criminalized conduct with animus towards a protected
147
group.
For example, the model legislation that the Anti148
Defamation League drafted in the early 1990s, and that many states
have adopted, imposes criminal punishment for engaging in criminal
149
conduct with impermissible bias.
Similarly, the federal hate-crime
law requires that the predicate criminal misconduct must have
occurred “because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or
141

In his reelection campaign, President Obama explicitly recognized these
connections. BARACKOBAMA.COM, President Obama and the Fight for LGBT Rights,
YOUTUBE
(May
23,
2013),
http://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=Tb60nFeJsNc&feature=player_embedded.
142
See Kahan, supra note 60, at 465–66.
143
See JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW AND
IDENTITY POLITICS 79–81 (1998).
144
This has been true for nearly a decade. See id. at 3 (describing hate-crime laws
in 1998 as a “routine category” of criminal law).
145
See id. at 67–68.
146
See id. at 29.
147
See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, HATE CRIMES STATUTES: A 1991 STATUS REPORT
2–5 (1991).
148
See id.
149
See JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 143 at 33–36.
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150

national origin of any person . . . .”
151
Using race as an example, an anti-classification policy would
compel a “colorblind” interpretation of the motive requirement.
Colorblindness’ proponents view equality formalistically, as requiring
152
across-the-board purging of race from public discourse.
That an
individual would attack another based on race, whatever that race
may be, deserves rebuke for having committed a hate crime. By this
view, any racially motivated attack, majority-on-minority, minority-onminority, or even minority-on-majority, ought to be prosecuted as a
hate crime.
Anti-subordination proponents will view hate crimes very
differently than anti-classification proponents, emphasizing their
153
historic origin in remedying violent acts upon minorities.
By an
anti-subordination account, equality requires undoing the
154
subjugation of minority groups.
From this perspective, the State
should only prosecute misconduct as a “hate crime” where the
conduct, symbolically or otherwise, reaffirms a relation of domination
between a dominant and subordinate group. The anti-subordination
proponent would likely be uncomfortable with, if not outright
opposed, to the prosecution of minority-on-majority attacks and,
155
possibly, minority-on-minority attacks as hate crimes.
The colorblind approach to hate crimes appears to have broad
purchase among prosecutors. One of the earliest hate-crime cases to
reach the Supreme Court involved a colorblind reading of

150

18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) (2013). See JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 143 at 31
(noting that “because of formulation” is a defining feature of hate-crime laws).
151
The majority of hate-crime incidences tend to involve racial animus. See LYNN
LANGTON AND MICHAEL PLANTY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HATE CRIME 2003–2009 4, 10 & Table 14 (2011).
152
See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV.
1, 43–46 (1991).
153
See Christopher Chorba, Note, The Danger of Federalizing Hate Crimes:
Congressional Misconceptions and the Unintended Consequences of the Hate Crimes Prevention
Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 319, 320–21 (2001).
154
See, e.g., Gotanda, supra note 152, at 63; Siegel, supra note 134, at 1545–46.
155
Cf. Gregory S. Parks & Shayne E. Jones, “Nigger”: A Critical Race Realist Analysis
of the N-Word Within Hate Crimes Law, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1305, 1342–46
(2008) (arguing that blacks should not be prosecuted for hate crimes even when
using the epithet “nigger,” but that whites should). An anti-subordinationist might
support hate-crime prosecutions for intra-group attacks that somehow reaffirmed
principles of racist domination. Cf. Doug Clark, Court Applies Hate-Crime Law Broadly,
GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, Mar. 3, 2010, at A11 (discussing state appellate court’s
affirmation of hate-crime conviction where white man shot another white man
because of former’s disapproval of the latter’s marriage to black woman).
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Wisconsin’s hate-crime statute. In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, Mitchell
challenged Wisconsin’s hate- crime sentencing enhancement under
156
the First Amendment. While his legal argument is not particularly
important here, what is important is that Mitchell was black while his
157
victim was white. Mitchell along with others, all of who were black,
had recently watched the film Mississippi Burning. Impelled by the
film’s depiction of racist violence against blacks, Mitchell and his
158
cohort attacked a white youth.
The attack was clearly a felonious
battery. It was, however, only “racist” from a colorblind perspective.
There is anecdotal evidence suggesting that such minority-on159
majority attacks are prosecuted as hate crimes with some regularity.
There is also anecdotal evidence suggesting that minority-on-minority
160
attacks are prosecuted as hate crimes with some regularity.
A
recent homicide involving a South Asian victim in New York City
illustrates this phenomenon. The assailant, a Latina, pushed the
161
victim into an oncoming subway train. In announcing its decision
to pursue a hate-crime prosecution, the Queens D.A.’s office
reported that she had made a remark to the police about the victim’s
162
having been a Muslim (he was actually a Hindu).
The D.A.’s
decision is entirely consistent with a colorblind approach to hate
crimes. An anti-subordination proponent, however, might question

156

See 508 U.S. 476, 480–82 (1993).
See id.
158
See id.
159
See JACOB & POTTER, supra note 149, at 17 (discussing black-on-white crimes);
Chorba, supra note 153, at 361–71 (describing cases in which black defendants were
charged with racially-motivated hate crimes).
160
See, e.g., Police: Arrest in Long Island Hate-Crime Beating, N.Y. POST, (Aug. 22,
2009),
http://www.nypost.com/f/print/news/regional
/item_ZvAeoojuDbg4rqyOmkf6SK (attack on Ecuadorean immigrant by Hispanic
man); Seven Black Teens Arrested for Hate Crimes After Video of Them ‘Attacking’ Latino Boy
Posted on YouTube, N.Y. POST (Mar. 31, 2012), http://www.nypost.com/p
/news/national/youtube_black_teens_arrested_attacking_Ca9Qxfp7DqZwKPsBribfL
K#ixzz1ux9LFGfY (black on Hispanic violence); Arthur Weinreb, Lesbians Charged
with Hate Crime Against Gay Man, DIGITAL J. (Feb. 27, 2012),
http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/320278 (lesbians charged with hate-crime for
attacking gay man); cf. Kantele Franko, Amish Gather Before Entering Prison for Hate
Crimes, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com
/USA/Latest-News-Wires/2013/0411/Amish-gather-before-entering-prison-for-hatecrimes; Erik Eckholm & Daniel Lovering, Renegade Group Is Accused in Bizarre Attacks
on Fellow Amish in Ohio, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2011, at A14 (stating that federal
prosecutors were considering whether to file hate-crime charges).
161
See Marc Santora, Woman Is Charged with Murder as a Hate Crime in a Fatal
Subway Push, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2012, at A15.
162
See id.
157
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the capacity in which such a homicide reproduces relations of
163
domination.
While difficult to make quantitative generalizations because of
data limitations, one can infer from Bureau of Justice Statistics data
that a colorblind approach to hate crimes may be widespread.
During the period from 2003 to 2009, the majority of hate-crime
164
victims were white.
Conviction-maximizing prosecutors may have
an incentive to embrace the colorblind interpretation of hate-crime
165
laws. The more charges in an indictment/information, the greater
the prosecutor’s leverage in charge and sentence bargaining—that is,
166
the prosecutor’s bargaining position in plea negotiations.
Prosecutors’ interest in conviction maximization will lead them to
interpret it broadly so that it applies in as many cases as possible. By
doing so, prosecutors will have endorsed a colorblind view of the
world without having expressly declared it as policy.
The classification versus subordination debate is not resolvable
by simple reference to statutory language. Nor is it resolvable by
reference to any cohesive public viewpoint. The terms of the debate,
at bottom, track the expressive conflict that swirled around hatecrimes laws when they were enacted.
Rather than resolving
expressive debate, hate-crimes laws’ passage obfuscated it, by
converting it into a question of prosecutorial discretion and driving it
under the radar. As with Stand Your Ground laws, it is difficult to say
precisely why individual prosecutors wield their enforcement
discretion as they do. While there is some aggregate data about hatecrime prosecutions and we can make generalizations about
prosecutors’ institutional incentives, both speak to the invisibility of
prosecutorial decision-making. Prosecutorial choices will only rarely
rekindle public debate—for example, when the rare defendant goes
163

The suspect’s history of mental illness would likely consolidate this view. See
Marc Santora & Anemona Hartocollis, Troubled Past For Suspect In Fatal Subway Push,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2012, at A1.
164
Sixty-one percent of victims were white. See LANGTON & PLANTY, supra note
151, at 7 & Table 9. The Bureau of Justice, however, does not track the race of
suspects. One might assume that the majority of these incidences involve non-racerelated bias (e.g., some these cases may consist of attacks motivated by some other
non-racial discriminatory animus). Given that race is the most frequent basis for a
hate-crime charge though, a significant number of these attacks against whites were
likely race-based. LANGTON & PLANTY, supra note 151, at 4, 10 & Table 14
165
A number of scholars have noted prosecutors’ incentive to maximize
convictions. See Bibas, supra note 12, at 985–86; Luna & Wade, supra note 12, at 1508;
Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 549–50.
166
See Pathological Politics, supra note 11, at 549–51.
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167

to trial in a publicly remarked case, or when a public body actually
168
rejects a hate-crime charge. Prosecutorial choices should have such
rekindling effect with much greater regularity.
C. Think Globally, Prosecute Locally
Because most district attorneys are elected in municipal or
169
county elections, it is tempting to conclude that prosecutors should
simply interpret criminal statutes in a manner that accords with local
preferences. This, however, is too parochial a conception of
prosecutors’ expressive obligations for two reasons. First, the local
political unit is not necessarily the most representative political
constituency when thinking about criminal laws enacted at the state
level. Second and related, the local political unit may be more prone
to parochialism than larger political units. This concern will be
particularly acute where expressive conflict implicates minority
interests.
While local head prosecutors typically owe their jobs to local
voters, they are charged with enforcing criminal laws that are, by and
170
large, enacted at the state level. The vast majority of criminal laws
in fact—for example, Stand Your Ground—are, like counties and
municipalities themselves, created by state law. The obligation to
enforce state law evenhandedly should have broader moral sweep
171
than pleasing one’s constituency.
If one accepts this premise, the
principal-agent problem should be conceived in terms of the whole
state. The obligation to enforce state criminal law evenhandedly is
tantamount to a duty to the political community in whose name those
laws were passed. Seminole County Prosecutor Norman Wolfinger
implicitly acknowledged this duty by withdrawing from the case
167

See supra notes 76–82 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Frank Donnelly, Jury: Beating of Mexican Wasn’t ‘Hate,’ Staten Island
Advance,
Apr.
24,
2010,
at
A1,
available
at
http://blog.silive.com/northshore/print.html?entry=/2010/04/robbery_gangassault_—_but_no.html (grand jury rejected hate-crime charge in case where one
Hispanic attacked another).
169
ARBITRARY JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 11, 166 (More than ninety-five percent of
district attorneys are elected in the United States).
170
But see Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 1409, 1470–72 (concluding that municipalities are increasingly
enacting their own criminal laws).
171
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (2013), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/mod
el_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_3_8_special_responsibilities_of_a_prosecutor
/comment_on_rule_3_8.html (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of
justice and not simply that of an advocate.”).
168
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172

against George Zimmerman.
Wolfinger suggested that his office
was unable to impartially investigate the Martin shooting in the face
173
of the broad public uproar over the case.
The second related problem with imagining prosecutors’
political obligations in wholly local terms is that local communities
can be parochial. Some criminal-justice scholars have argued that
local and sub-local communities exercise political power consistently
with liberal ideals because of the intimate associations between
174
victims, offenders, and other residents.
The underlying notion
here is that these communities have experiential knowledge of the
full range of costs and benefits that crime and law enforcement
175
generate. Many have criticized this romantic view of localism.
“Political process failure” is possible in any heterogeneous
176
community, even small ones. “Process failure” refers to an electoral
majority’s willingness to consistently impose material or symbolic
177
costs upon a disfavored minority.
For example, if the majority of
voters in a particular jurisdiction are homophobic, one would not
expect the political process to encourage the prosecutor’s office to be
178
particularly responsive to crimes targeting gay persons.
But,
localism may very well present even graver dangers if a community is
small and relatively homogeneous.
Richard Schragger has noted that disfavoring perceived
172

See Alvarez & Cooper, supra note 3.
See Letter From Norman Wolfinger to Governor Rick Scott (Mar. 22, 2012),
available
at
http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03
/3.22.2012WolfingerLetter.pdf.
174
See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis Of Criminal
Procedure, 86 GEO. L. J. 1153, 1160–66, 1182 (1998); see also Unequal Justice, supra note
9, at 2031–32 (arguing for more local control over criminal justice system). But see
Robert Weisberg, Norms and Criminal Law, and the Norms of Criminal Law Scholarship,
93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 467, 508–14 (2003) (criticizing “social norms” approach
to policing “inner city”); Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 371, 384–87 (2001) (same).
175
See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Unpacking New Policing: Confessions of a Former
Neighborhood District Attorney, 78 WASH. L. REV. 985, 1005, 1010 (2003); Schragger,
supra note 174, at 416–459.
176
See David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to
the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L. J. 1059, 1086 (1999) (“[O]nce one
looks beyond romanticized invocations of ‘the community,’ it becomes apparent that
no community is united on these issues.”).
177
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 78–87
(1980). Criminal-law scholars have become increasingly interested in the notion of
process failure. See, e.g., Political Constitution, supra note 24, at 818.
178
Cf. Kahan, supra note 60, at 467 (discussing Texas case in which judge
imposed lenient sentence upon a defendant who had killed two gay men).
173
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outsiders is how some local communities consolidate their own self179
Frequently, race plays a role in distinguishing insider
definition.
180
from outsider. Many leveled a version of this criticism at Seminole
County— by suggesting that police and prosecutors would have been
181
quicker to act had Trayvon Martin been white.
Voters in
homogeneous communities may very well have settled views on
matters that are hotly debated in the larger political unit of which
that community is a part. For example, one could imagine how a
small, homogenous white community might be quicker to accept that
minority-on-majority violence is best treated as a “hate crime” than a
more diverse community might. The opacity of most prosecutorial
decision-making will generally mean that such enforcement choices
go unremarked. When police and prosecutors behave in a manner
that is consistent with local political values, absent exceptional
circumstances, local voters will not complain. And there is unlikely to
182
be very much notice of those choices on the outside. Prosecutorial
opacity will quell political dialogue and obfuscate the political
cleavages that exist between communities.
The Martin shooting illustrates the dangers of political localism.
Had the Martin shooting not received broad state and national
attention, there is good reason to think that prosecutors would have
been even slower to charge Zimmerman had they done so at all. As
discussed above, there was considerable expressive conflict over Stand
183
Your Ground in 2005 when enacted.
Seminole County, however,
was not the epicenter of that opposition. It is more than eighty
184
185
186
percent white, middle-income, and republican. It is difficult to
say what course the investigation/prosecution of Zimmerman would
have taken had it been left entirely to the Seminole County
179

See Schragger, supra note 174, at 376, 404–05.
See Schragger, supra note 174, at 376, 404–05.
181
See Dan Barry, et al., In the Eye of a Firestorm, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2012, at A1.
182
The press has highlighted a number of other cases that seem similar to
Martin’s, but had received virtually no attention until the Martin shooting. See, e.g.,
Severson, supra note 8; Simon & O’Neill, supra note 8.
183
See supra notes 103–113 and accompanying text.
184
See United States Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts, Seminole
County, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/12117.html (last visited Dec.
24, 2013).
185
See id.
186
See Dave Trotter, Understanding the I-4 Corridor: Part II: Trending Seminole County,
The
Political
Hurricane,
http://thepoliticalhurricane.com/2012/09/08
/understanding-the-i-4-corridor-part-ii-trending-seminole-county/ (last visited Dec.
24, 2013).
180
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prosecutor.
While the Martin shooting and Zimmerman acquittals have
impelled broad discussion of Stand Your Ground and self-defense
laws, extra-local pressure has precipitated it.
Critical public
sentiment did not rise organically in Seminole County and then
spread outward. In the shooting’s immediate wake, the local
response was quite limited. The Martin family and civil rights groups
bear considerable responsibility for galvanizing public interest
outside of Seminole County and Florida. Several weeks elapsed
187
before the Martin shooting became state and national news.
The
broad-based public outcry against the shooting, in turn, forced
conversation about the relationship between race, Stand Your
Ground laws, and enforcement discretion. Regardless of one’s
feelings about the Martin shooting in particular, the conversation is
an important one. Had it been left to voters in Seminole County,
that dialogue may not have occurred. Informed and ongoing public
dialogue regarding such cleavages, even if heated, is healthy for our
political culture. The question then becomes what responsibility
should prosecutors bear with regard to promoting and structuring
such dialogue. The next Part addresses that question.
IV. THE PEDAGOGICAL PROSECUTOR
This Part addresses the ends to which prosecutors should use the
unique expressive power that Part III shows they possess. While most
scholars are concerned with how best to regulate prosecutors, this
Part advances a vision of prosecutors holding both legislatures and
the public accountable for their criminal justice policy preferences,
biases, and blind spots.
Drawing on liberal precepts, Section A argues that the ideal
prosecutor should behave “pedagogically” vis-à-vis the legislature and
public. Behaving pedagogically means actively trying to advance
constructive public dialogue around criminal justice norms,
particularly (but not exclusively) those that have generated expressive
conflict. Behaving pedagogically would serve two functions. First, it
would promote constructive public dialogue, which liberal accounts
suggest is essential to a vibrant democracy. Second, it would impel
legislatures to regularly revisit and reconsider criminal laws that they
have passed in light of those laws’ real-world consequences.

187

See Simon & O’Neill, supra note 8 (noting, in an April news article, that the
Martin shooting had occurred in February).
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Section B sketches some practical implications that flow from
the pedagogical ideal. The pedagogical prosecutor would not be
fixated on maximizing convictions. There are cases where an
acquittal should be chalked up as a prosecutorial success. The
pedagogical prosecutor would also be much more forthright about
cases she declines to prosecute. State government could take steps to
advance the pedagogical ideal on both of these fronts.
A. A Pedagogical Obligation
Most scholarship on prosecutorial discretion culminates by
proposing a series of regulatory reforms designed to improve
188
prosecutorial accountability.
But, legislatures and the public must
also be held accountable for their preferences, biases, and blind
spots. Accountability is ideally a two-way street. The discussion above
has argued that prosecutors are uniquely positioned to play this role.
Accordingly, the ideal prosecutor would behave “pedagogically.”
“Pedagogically,” means actively trying to inform and educate
citizens and the legislature for the purpose of impelling political
dialogue. This obligation would be in addition to (not in lieu of) the
189
obligation to do justice in individual cases.
This pedagogic
obligation flows from the unique position that prosecutors inhabit
within the criminal justice system: in addition to their unique
expressive power, prosecutors have a near-monopoly on information
regarding the criminal justice system’s inputs, outputs, and the
relation between the two. Prosecutors screen the pool of incidents
that the police refer to them for charging. Prosecutors have near
190
complete discretion on whether to proceed in any particular case.
And, of course, prosecutors have considerable leverage with regard to
how a case will be disposed of—by trial, plea, or some other
191
mechanism. There is no other actor in the criminal justice system
that is as well situated to describe how the pool of prospective
offenders relates to those who are convicted.
The notion of a pedagogic obligation is anchored in a liberal
conceptualization of the state and criminal justice. In most liberal
192
accounts, the state’s legitimacy hinges on citizen consent.
A
188

See supra Part II.
See infra Part IV.B.iii.
190
See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1995).
191
See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 13, at 2129, 2132–33.
192
See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 6 (1980); JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 15–18 (1971); Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law?, 116
189
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properly functioning liberal state will respond to the people’s will
within specified constraints—that is, a political process and system of
193
civil rights that forecloses fundamental unfairness to individuals.
This conception accepts policy-making as the site of contest and takes
194
structured debate as a necessary feature of democratic coexistence.
In idealized liberal accounts, citizens are well informed, engaged with
each other, and prepared to change their minds in response to good
195
arguments.
The more complex a state becomes the more opaque
its bureaucratic functions will come to seem; citizens will be less able
to ascertain what the state is actually doing and what the
consequences of any given policy choice are.
Filling such
information gaps is necessary for political dialogue and governance
by consent to remain meaningful. This is particularly true with
regard to criminal justice policy.
Imposing criminal sanctions has unique significance in a liberal
196
state.
It is the paradigmatic example of the state’s monopoly on
“legitimate violence.” It is by authority of criminal law that the state
forcibly removes an individual from society, brands him a “criminal,”
and subjects him to confinement or other deprivation. Accordingly,
one would expect the ideal liberal citizen to be particularly attentive
197
to the content and consequences of criminal law. This would be all
the more true for criminal laws over which there has been expressive
conflict. Because these are, by definition, laws over which citizens
disagree—that is, where consent is fractured—liberal precepts of
responsive government require regular reconsideration of such laws’
validity in light of changing social circumstances.
Prosecutors are the best positioned to play the pedagogical
function that a liberal criminal justice system requires.
The
pedagogical prosecutor would make choices that are not just
designed to maximize her office’s conviction rate, but rather, to
educate legislators and the public. “Pedagogical” specifies a relation
of public trust without limiting the relevant public to a narrow

YALE L. J. 1022, 1038 (2007) (book review).
193
See RAWLS, supra note 18, at xliii–xliv.
194
See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 192, at 6, 70, 73, 88; RAWLS, supra note 18, at
xliii–xliv.
195
See RAWLS, supra note 18, at xlix (describing notion of “civic friendship”).
196
See Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 307, 314 (2004).
197
The average and ideal citizen are, of course, different things. See RAWLS, supra
note 18, at 16 (describing idealized citizen in the “original position”).
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198

electoral unit.
The pedagogical prosecutor would both share
information that is relevant to expressive debate and exercise her
charging and sentencing discretion in ways that promote constructive
public dialogue. The primary point here would not be to promote
prosecutorial accountability (though that might be a useful
byproduct). Rather, it would be to impel belief-testing within the
political community. While such a process may lead to tentative
political agreements, it is unlikely to do so in permanent ways—that is
both the joy and frustration of pluralistic democracy. Accordingly,
the pedagogical prosecutor’s goal should not be to steer the public
towards a particular political result. Rather, the goal should be to
promote broad engagement with issues of critical importance to our
collective political life.
A completely theorized agreement is likely impossible with
199
regard to self-defense and hate-crime laws. Not only are these the
kinds of issues around which we should expect disagreement, people
imagine these issues as continuous with other ideological
200
commitments that define their political identities.
For example, a
libertarian might see a permissive self-defense rule tightly braided
with anti-gun control and anti-tax positions.
Critics of the
Zimmerman acquittal inveighed against racism, gun control, and
201
violence, often in the same breath.
Identity’s salience in debates
over these issues means that they are probably not susceptible to
enduring political or technocratic resolution. This is not to say that
individuals and institutions will doggedly embrace the same positions
over time.
For example, how would discussion around hate crimes change
if it became clear that prosecutions were often for minority-majority
attacks or petty crimes? Opposition to the expansion of hate-crime
statutes might ease. Civil rights groups might more aggressively
advocate for the passage of laws that expressly embraced antisubordination principles. Perhaps hate crimes would appear like an
altogether less attractive technique for advancing a civil rights
agenda. Or how would the terms of discussion change regarding
Stand Your Ground if it emerged that the vast majority of self-defense
claims involved the use of force during a home invasion? What if it
198

See supra Part III.C.
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
200
See Kahan, supra note 60, at 464–66.
201
See, e.g., Michael Muskal, Zimmerman Not Guilty, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2013, at 1;
Nagourney, supra note 113.
199
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was also clear that these were the kinds of cases that prosecutors were
least likely to prosecute under the old statute?
A pedagogical model of prosecutorial discretion challenges the
norms of bureaucratic invisibility that currently insulate prosecutors
from scrutiny, relieve legislatures from responsibility for enacting
sensible laws, and save citizens from having to think too much about
the content or consequences of their knee-jerk beliefs about criminal
justice. As discussed in Part II, most prosecutorial choices are made
202
well below the horizon of public notice. While such invisibility may
be an inevitable feature of criminal justice machineries that are as
203
sprawling and fragmented as our own, it starves our political culture
of information and dialogic impetus. It allows all of us to embrace
easy solutions to complex problems about which we disagree—for
example, the notion that simply “repealing” Stand Your Ground will
204
prevent future Trayvon Martins from dying.
A pedagogical model contemplates a shift in prosecutorial
sensibility from an inward-looking, conviction orientation to an
outward-looking, pedagogical orientation. As matters now stand,
high “conviction rates” tend to be presented and received by the
public as evidence of prosecutors’ ability. This, of course, is as much
a statement about how prosecutors campaign for reelection as it is
205
about voters’ expectations and attention spans.
A pedagogical
ethos would value public airing for its own sake, regardless of what
outcomes it produced in particular cases.
It would not be radical for prosecutors to privilege “public
airing”—it has deep precedent in our legal system. Public airing’s
pedagogical benefits have been long-recognized—for example,
among the rationales justifying trial by jury is the benefit that inures
to jurors by virtue of participating in an intensively deliberative civic
206
process.
The benefit extends beyond the jury room.
After
202

See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (noting federal
prosecutors’ “broad discretion”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
203
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 461
(1993) (“[T]he criminal justice ‘system’ is not a system at all.”).
204
This would be particularly unhelpful if “repeal” simply meant eliminating the
“stand your ground” language in the Florida’s self-defense statute. See supra Part
III.B.i.
205
See Bibas, supra note 12, at 983–91.
206
See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991) (“The opportunity for
ordinary citizens to participate in the administration of justice has long been
recognized as one of the principal justifications for retaining the jury system.”); but
see Caren Myers Morrison, Jury 2.0, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1579, 1622–24 (2011)
(suggesting that the jury’s role has become precariously symbolic and that its vitality
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completing their service, jurors discuss their experiences with those
around them and are generally more inclined to participate in other
207
civic activities.
A public airing—for example, a trial or some other sort of
hearing with witness testimony—has pedagogical value for two
primary reasons. First, because of its intrinsically dramatic nature, a
public airing is likely to attract attention—certainly much more so
than disposition by agreement or some other mechanism that does
not entail a public re-telling of the incident. The prospect of
attracting attention will be even higher where the applicable criminal
law is (or has been) the subject of expressive conflict.
Second, public airing highlights how contested legal principles
play out in concrete circumstances. It provides fact-rich data points
to inform expressive claims. This allows legislators and citizens to
reevaluate their expressive commitments prior to returning to the
208
debate—a kind of personal exercise in reflective equilibrium. Were
the legislatures’ premises for enacting a law correct? Does the law
produce the outcomes that gave rise to expressive conflict in the first
place? It may be idealistic to expect large numbers of people to
regularly change their minds about issues they care about after
having engaged in some form of liberal dialogue. But, the vitality of a
democratic society does not require that some fixed number of minds
be changed in the course of any particular dialogic bout. The
ultimate purpose is not to achieve a final political consensus, but to
continue debate, reconsider existing policies and, hopefully, increase
209
political engagement in the process.
B. Implications
Vigorous commitment to the kind of public airing that the
pedagogical obligation requires could have a range of practical
consequences. Most salient among them would be an increased
number of criminal trials and systematic disclosures about cases that
is at risk).
207
See Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Justice & Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 659,
661 (2002) (noting Alexis de Tocqueville’s observation that jury is an important
device for populist, civic education); Mary Lombardi, Note, Reassessing Jury Service
Citizenship Requirements, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 725, 759–60 (2009) (summarizing
social science studies).
208
Cf. RAWLS, supra note 18, at 48 (describing “reflective equilibrium” as process
whereby theoretical commitments are tempered and adjusted in light of existing
social and political arrangements).
209
See RAWLS, supra note 18, at 226–27, 241, 243.
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are pled or declined. State governments could help overcome local
political hurdles. In addition, prosecutors might be encouraged to
live up to the ideals sketched in Section A by including them in the
rules of ethics.
1. Trying Tough Cases
Prosecutors taking their pedagogical responsibility seriously
would have significant consequences for trial practice generally, and
“tough cases” in particular. “Tough,” refers to plausible cases where
securing a conviction may be challenging or particularly resource
intensive. For such cases, prosecutors may be inclined to offer steep
charge or sentencing discounts as part of plea offers. These might be
cases with particularly ambiguous or complicated facts. They might
be cases that do not fit within the ambit of what was legislatively (or
popularly) contemplated by a law’s proponents when enacted. This
may be especially true for cases involving laws that have been the
210
subject of expressive conflict.
Measuring prosecutorial success
largely in terms of convictions will lead prosecutors to make choices
that do little to stimulate broad debate. “Losing” tough cases that
further constructive public dialogue should be recognized as success.
If criminal trials were valued for their own sake (i.e., without regard
for outcome), prosecutors might be less inclined to obtain
convictions by agreement in “tough cases.” States could make this
possible by helping prosecutors overcome local political obstacles to
such public airing.
Zimmerman is an example of a tough case. The acquittal did not
detract from the case’s pedagogical value and, perhaps, even
amplified it. Trayvon Martin’s shooting was evocative of just the sort
of vigilantism that Stand Your Ground’s opponents warned of.
Moreover, it demonstrated the racial consequences such vigilantism
211
can have.
Martin’s death created a plausible criminal case, but
there were significant evidentiary challenges. The prosecutor had to
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that Zimmerman
intentionally killed Martin, but there was little direct evidence on the
212
subject—Zimmerman had eliminated the best witness.
The acquittal, of course, precipitated protests, far-ranging
commentary on race’s continuing significance in our society, and the
210

See supra notes 99–113 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 3–8, 109–112 and accompanying text.
212
See Lizette Alvarez, Zimmerman Trial, Opening This Week, Will Raise Complex
Questions, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2013, at A16.
211
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213

relationship between self-defense and gun violence.
While some of
214
the discussion has been predictably partisan, much of it has not.
Calls to reconsider Stand Your Ground laws have come from some
215
surprising quarters.
Even if “Stand Your Ground” is primarily a
216
rhetorical flourish, there are aspects of these laws, beyond the
flourish, that are worth reconsidering. For instance, Florida’s law
contains provisions that discourage public airing. Where a would-be
defender uses deadly force in her home or car, no inquiry is
permitted into whether she subjectively experienced fear of
217
imminent injury.
This forecloses trial in both ambiguous and
unambiguous cases—that is, the presumption is not rebuttable
regardless of how obviously the would-be defender did not fear
imminent harm.
Whether Zimmerman precipitates specific changes in Stand Your
Ground laws, however, should not be the measure of its pedagogical
effect. It is the calls to reconsider (and rejoinders thereto) in and of
themselves that are the proper measure. A liberal state’s vitality
hinges on regularly revisiting contested social questions and airing
218
different views.
Sometimes this will quickly precipitate changes in
laws or social norms; other times slowly; and other times not at all. It
is this iterative process, as opposed to any tentative consensus around
a particular issue, that the pedagogical prosecutor should seek to
sustain.
Blindly encouraging defendants to plead guilty in tough cases
presents a sharp threat to democratic vitality. While it is common to
219
lament criminal trials’ endangered species status,
few have
213

See Muskal, supra note 201; Nagourney, supra note 113; Adam Aaro, Money
Raised To Buy Zimmerman a New Gun, FOX NEWS (Aug. 3, 2013),
http://www.myfox28columbus.com/template/cgi-bin/archived.pl?type=basic&file
=/shared/news/features/top-stories/stories/archive/2013/07/sCQ08lLL.xml;
Regina Garcia Cano, George Zimmerman Gets $12,000 Towards Buying Gun from Ohio
Firearms
Group,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(July
26,
2013,
1:11
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/26/george-zimmermangun_n_3660067.html.
214
President Obama explicated black perceptions of the criminal justice system,
but also urged all to accept the Zimmerman acquittal. See Nagourney, supra note 113.
215
Senator John McCain forcefully exhorted state legislatures to review Stand
Your Ground statutes. See Geoff Earle, Mac Rips ‘Stand Ground,’ N.Y. POST, July 22,
2013, at 5.
216
See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text.
217
See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing presumption of
reasonableness).
218
See supra Part IV.A.
219
See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 206, at 1622–23 & nn.301–03 (summarizing
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recognized that their rarity takes an expressive toll.
While
220
prosecutorial declinations are quite literally “under the radar,”
pleas are functionally the same from an expressive perspective.
Although there will be a public record of pleas, that record is unlikely
to play much role in public debate. Pleas are taken after minimal
factual investigation and are not recorded in ways that are especially
221
accessible.
The proliferation of criminal laws gives prosecutors a
222
Prosecutors
powerful chip with which to negotiate convictions.
have near-absolute discretion to file or drop charges against a
defendant. Offering to drop charges in exchange for a plea on those
223
that remain is a powerful strategy for extracting pleas.
Hate crimes further illustrate the democratic harms that may
result from failing to try tough cases. Hate-crime prosecutions for
minority-on-minority or minority-on-majority crimes are likely to
224
grate against many proponents’ view of those laws’ purposes.
A
widespread colorblind interpretation of hate-crime laws might lead
minority advocacy groups to reconsider whether hate-crime laws
advance those communities’ interests. And yet, prosecutors are likely
to adopt a colorblind interpretation of hate-crime laws “under the
radar.” Hate crimes will always overlap extensively with other
225
crimes.
This may have the effect of amplifying prosecutorial
leverage in plea bargaining. Assume a case involving a black-on-black
226
In a
battery in which the defendant called the victim a “nigger.”
jurisdiction where prosecutors believe a colorblind reading of the
causation requirement is plausible, a prosecutor might charge a hate
crime in hopes of using it as leverage to extract a plea on the
227
underlying battery charge. Assuming that such a practice results in
literature).
220
This Article is not suggesting that prosecutors try implausible cases. They
should, however, be more transparent about the kinds of cases they are not trying.
See infra Part IV.B.ii.
221
See infra Part IV.B.ii.
222
See Political Constitution, supra note 24, at 802–04.
223
See Tradeoff, supra note 12, at 111–13 (advocating for limit on charge
bargaining).
224
See supra notes 153–155 and accompanying text. By the same token, it is likely
to allay many critics’ fears.
225
See supra notes 146–149 and accompanying text.
226
See Parks & Jones, supra note 155, at 1342–43.
227
In a jurisdiction where the hate-crime statute was a sentencing enhancement,
we might expect a similar dynamic to play out in the form of sentencing bargaining.
See Tradeoff, supra note 12, at 111. While there are important differences between
charge and sentence-bargaining, for present purposes the basic dynamic is the same:
the prosecutors’ interest in obtaining a conviction impels a de facto policy of
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more pleas (or longer sentences) in cases where hate crimes can be
plausibly charged, we should expect conviction-maximizing
prosecutors to drift towards a policy of colorblindness. That policy
choice, however, would never be formally announced as such.
A pedagogical vision of the prosecutorial function aspires to
more than just a shift in prosecutorial behavior. It contemplates a
broad, long-term shift in public culture and expectations.
Prosecutors likely view success or failure in terms of their conviction
rate because the voting public tends to. In the wake of George
Zimmerman’s acquittal, there has been extensive commentary on the
228
prosecutors’ various strategic errors in trial.
Whether true or not,
that mode of evaluating the trial entirely overlooks its expressive
significance. Given that head prosecutors tend to be local politicians,
it may be unrealistic to expect them to unilaterally embrace the
pedagogical model. For example, Seminole County voters might very
well have held it against their elected prosecutor if he had prosecuted
Zimmerman. Of course, it was not Seminole County’s prosecutor
229
that was, ultimately, responsible for the prosecution. This hints at
ways in which state governments could help advance pedagogical
prosecuting.
State governments should make resources available to prosecute
expressively significant cases. Doing so would help relieve local
prosecutors of the political burdens that might complicate such
efforts. It could also help mitigate the impetus to plea bargain tough
cases. Such support could simply take the form of additional state
funding to litigate tough cases, although this would not speak to the
conviction-maximizing incentives that local politics create. A more
ambitious approach might involve state governments creating
specialized state-level prosecutorial units that are specifically charged
with litigating “tough cases.” This would not be so different from the
specialized prosecutorial units that some states create to deal with
230
specialized or complex cases.

colorblindness. See supra notes 151–163 (discussing colorblindness versus antisubordination).
228
See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, Self-Defense, Hard To Topple, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2013, at
A1.
229
See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
230
For example, in New York State the Attorney General’s office is responsible
for prosecuting specific categories of crime. See e.g., Criminal Enforcement and
Financial Crimes Bureau, NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
http://www.ag.ny.gov/bureau/criminal-prosecutions-bureau (last visited Nov. 12,
2013).
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This brief sketch, of course, leaves a host of operational
questions about case selection and the division of authority between
local and state prosecutors. There are a variety of schemes
imaginable on both fronts. State prosecutors could select cases, local
prosecutors could refer cases, or there could be some collaborative
intermediate approach. Cases could be selected according to criteria
determined in advance by the legislature, prosecutors, or some other
entity. Alternatively, local or state prosecutors could be left to make
ad hoc discretionary judgments. This is intended as a jumping-off
point only—programmatic details should be the subject of future
research.
2. Filling the Information Gap
While trial is a powerful device for impelling public dialogue, it
is not the only device. In most jurisdictions, it is unlikely that
prosecutors can try every plausible case. And, of course, there will be
cases that are facially implausible and are appropriately declined.
With a law like Stand Your Ground, the legislature’s express purpose
seems to have been, in part, to encourage more declinations. Pleas
are low-visibility choices while declinations are entirely invisible. For
these choices to play any role in stimulating public dialogue, they
must be more visible. Prosecutors should systematically make
information available regarding these choices. At the most general
level, such information should include interpretations of criminal
laws—particularly those around which there has been expressive
conflict—and general enforcement priorities. Such information
should also include specific details regarding cases that were declined
or resolved by plea.
Prosecutors have wide policy-making discretion. Prosecutors
should clearly announce their policy choices as such. Doing so would
provide important information to legislators, advocacy groups, and
the public about a law’s consequences. Hate-crime laws present a
good example of how this might work. As discussed, lexical
ambiguity regarding the motive requirement in hate-crime laws
231
echoes the expressive contest that attended passage of the laws.
The hypothetical discussion in Part IV.B.i illustrated how a
conviction-maximizing prosecutor will, in effect, tend towards a
colorblind interpretation of the causation requirement. Prosecutors
should announce such choices clearly. Such a move has precedent.

231

See Part III.B.ii.
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In some jurisdictions, for example, prosecutors have announced
232
official policies not to seek the death penalty.
The salutary effects of announcing office policy need not be
limited to interpretations of laws that have been subject to expressive
conflict. There may be criminal laws on the books that have long
gone unquestioned, but should be at the center of expressive debate.
For example, in 2004, the San Francisco District Attorney’s Office
announced that prosecuting low-level sex workers was not an
233
enforcement priority.
The statement impelled proponents and
234
detractors to debate the merits of criminalizing commercial sex. A
prosecutor’s office could take a similar tack with any number of laws
that seem outmoded or unjust.
Of course, a pithy policy statement regarding enforcement
priorities will not always be possible or helpful. It may, for example,
be impossible to imagine the myriad circumstances in which a
defendant would plausibly raise a self-defense claim. To ask
prosecutors to declare a general policy regarding Stand Your Ground
might not be especially helpful. It would, however, be helpful if
prosecutors were forthcoming about concrete choices they made
regarding such cases after the fact—that is, the decision to decline
prosecution. This is true even in instances where a prosecutor’s
office commits itself to a particular policy position. Data regarding
actual prosecutions and declinations will help observers ascertain
what difference, if any, a particular law is having in the world.
Declination and plea data present particularly pressing
informational gaps. While an enterprising researcher might be able
to construct a rough profile of declined cases based on police reports,
235
this is a tall task and likely to be incomplete. In many cases, it will
be impossible to know with certainty why prosecutors elected to
decline a particular case. Prosecutors do not typically make such data
available and, even in the rare cases that they do, they are not entirely
236
Information regarding pleas
transparent about their motivations.
232

See, e.g., Leigh B. Beinen, Capital Punishment in Illinois in the Aftermath of the
Ryan Commutations: Reforms, Economic Realities, and a New Saliency for Issues of Cost, 100
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1301, 1377 n.307 (2010).
233
See Philip Matier & Andrew Ross, Cops, D.A. Tangle over Strip Club Raids, SAN
FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE,
July
12,
2004,
at
B1,
available
at
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/matier-ross/article/Cops-D-A-tangle-over-strip-clubraids-3324156.php#page-2.
234
Id.
235
See supra notes 129–131 and accompanying text.
236
See Black Box, supra note 13, at 151–154.
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will be more readily obtainable because it is public record; however,
as with declinations, it would take a behemoth effort to gather and
assemble the information to be useful for stimulating public debate.
Using Stand Your Ground as an example, it would take substantial
effort to compile a profile of how initial charging decisions relate to
final convictions in cases where a defendant has alleged self-defense.
For example, let’s assume that, following Stand Your Ground’s
enactment, Florida prosecutors began routinely reducing
manslaughter charges to misdemeanor assault charges in cases where
there was a self-defense claim. It would be difficult to gather the
information necessary to demonstrate that reality. An investigator
would have to scour court records in various jurisdictions, review files
for individual cases, and compare pleas to the original indictments.
Were such an endeavor possible, it would still reveal little about
prosecutors’ motivations. Ascertaining information about the race of
the victim or the circumstances under which defensive force was used
might very well require obtaining the police report and interviewing
witnesses. This is to say that, even where information is publicly
available, it is buried in documents managed by different
bureaucracies. To be a useful resource for public debate, such
237
information would have to be assembled in a user-friendly way.
While we should expect prosecutors to be more forthright with
information relevant to public debate, state attorney general offices
(or some other centralized bureaucracy) should collect and assemble
it. Stand Your Ground is a good vehicle for roughly sketching how
this might work.
Prosecutors should provide relevant information regarding their
decisions to decline prosecution in cases involving self-defense. They
should provide information that is germane to the expressive debate
that characterizes self-defense in general and Stand Your Ground in
particular. Opponents argue that Stand Your Ground encourages
lawless violence that unduly impacts minorities. Proponents contend
that Stand Your Ground allows individuals to protect themselves from
violent attacks. From these simple statements of position, it is clear
that several pieces of information regarding declination decisions
would usefully inform public discussion: the nature of the defensive
force (e.g., gunshot); its consequence (e.g., death); the injured
individual’s race and gender; the race and gender of the individual
237

But see Black Box, supra note 13, at 186–87 (describing Bureau of Justice
Statistics and how the information it compiles is intended for “a small number of
sophisticated or committed users. . .”).
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who used defensive force; and summary case facts. Summary case
facts should include a brief narrative of the case that addresses those
dimensions of the incident that are most relevant to expressive
debate around self-defense. For example, that an individual used
force against another who was in the midst of a home invasion would
be obviously relevant to expressive debate. Similarly relevant might be
the fact that force was used in response to domestic violence. All the
case circumstances that might be relevant to expressive debate
cannot be identified in advance. We would, in large measure, have to
rely upon pedagogical prosecutors’ good judgment.
3. Defining “Justice”
The absence of political will to regulate prosecutors and the
absence of competent regulators will stymie any external effort to
constrain (or direct) prosecutorial discretion. As discussed in Part II,
the absence of a plausible mechanism for achieving sweeping control
of prosecutorial prerogative has led a few scholars to focus on
238
What these
internal, managerial, and technocratic reform.
approaches might claim in the way of practicality, they surrender in
the way of normative ambition. This tension pervades all scholarship
about prosecutorial agency, this piece included. There is likely no
grand solution to the problem. Changing how prosecutors and the
public engage one another will require myriad technocratic, cultural,
and financial shifts. Systematically plotting those changes is beyond
this (or any single) article’s scope. It makes sense to think about
reforms that will nudge prosecutors to voluntarily behave in the ways
suggested by this Article. One place to start might be ethical rules for
prosecutors.
Rules of ethics suggest that prosecutors’ primary obligation is to
239
do “justice.”
The notion of justice should explicitly embrace a
pedagogical function. Ethical rules, however, tend to focus on the
panoply of constitutional rules that define prosecutor’s
240
responsibilities in individual cases.
Justice, however, entails
something more than obeying the Constitution. That is especially
true given the discretionary breadth that prosecutors enjoy. The

238

See supra Part II.A.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (2013), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/mod
el_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_3_8_special_responsibilities_of_a_prosecutor
/comment_on_rule_3_8.html.
240
See id.
239
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Constitution leaves it to prosecutors to make all sorts of decisions
without judicial review. “Justice” should have some bearing on how
prosecutors exercise that discretion. Ethical rules might therefore
give more precise content to the word “justice.” In particular, justice
should require that prosecutors bear some pedagogical responsibility
in cases involving expressive conflict. The obligation to advance
public dialogue in such cases might be achieved in any number of
ways, three of which are discussed in the section above. As an initial
matter, it may be wise to formulate the ethical obligation broadly,
leaving considerable leeway for prosecutorial judgment on what
constitutes expressive conflict. The ultimate goal is to begin an
acculturation process through which prosecutors will internalize a
pedagogical self-perception over time.
V. CONCLUSION
Prosecutors have unique expressive power in a pluralist
democracy like our own. Cases implicating Stand Your Ground and
hate-crimes laws powerfully illustrate this argument. The expressive
conflict over Stand Your Ground implicates urgent questions about
the relationship between individualism, violence, and criminal law.
The expressive conflict over hate crimes implicates urgent questions
about equality and minorities’ dignitary status. In neither context did
enacting laws exhaust the basis of expressive conflict. Rather, the
laws’ passage shifted the locus of expressive power from legislatures
to prosecutors’ offices.
A healthy, pluralist democracy benefits from sustained dialogue
in legislatures and amongst citizens. Pedagogical prosecutors would
systematically use their expressive power to promote such dialogue.
In advancing a pedagogical ideal for prosecutors, this Article has
advocated for a shift in both prosecutorial and political culture.
Prosecutors should learn to think of success in much broader terms
than simply obtaining convictions. By the same token, the public
must learn to credit prosecutors who are actively pedagogical, even if
it comes at the price of a lower conviction rate. In such a world,
prosecutors would not have been slow to prosecute George
Zimmerman. Nor would the public have been quick to view the
acquittal as a sign of failure.

